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Abstract— The relationship between data breaches 
and identity crime has been scarcely explored in 
current literature.  However, there is an important 
relationship between the misuse of personal 
identification information and identity crime as the 
former is in many respects the catalyst for the latter. 
Data breaches are one of the ways in which this 
personal identification information is obtained by 
identity criminals, and thereby any response to data 
breaches is likely to impact the incidence of identity 
crime.  Initiatives around data breach notification 
have become increasingly prevalent and are now seen 
in many State legislatures in the United States and 
overseas. The Australian Government is currently in 
the process of introducing mandatory data breach 
notification laws. This paper explores the 
introduction of mandatory data breach notification 
in Australia, and lessons learned from the experience 
in the US, particularly noting the link between data 
breaches and identity crime. The paper proposes that 
through the introduction of such laws, identity crimes 
are likely to be reduced. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The Australian Government has raised 
considerable debate around the introduction of data 
breach notification as a way of preserving data 
arising through breaches of data [1]. Public instances 
of data breaches have attracted awareness of the 
need for greater protection of personal data [1]. The 
heightened public awareness of these issues has 
prompted the Australian Government to introduce 
laws in Australia to deal with data breach 
notification [2], the fundamental purpose of which 
is that the person whose data has been breached has 
a “right to know” of this breach [3]. Mandatory data 
breach notification is a legal requirement on the 
holder of data to notify those affected in the event of 
a data breach [1]; thus, through being notified of a 
breach, the person whose data has been misused 
may take appropriate action to prevent further harm 
resulting [4].   
 
There are scarce information to link the 
notification of data breaches and identity crime, 
however, based on reports from the United States it 
is argued that a discernable reduction in the 
incidence of identity crime can occur through the 
introduction of mandatory breach notification laws 
[5]. Australia is in the process of introducing 
mandatory breach notification laws, which are in 
their final stages of legislative enactment, and will 
provide new opportunities to consider the 
relationship between mandatory breach notification 
and crime, in particular, identity crime. Data 
breaches are likely to become more important given 
the trends toward cloud computing and large data 
sets.   
II. THE VULNERABILITIES OF PERSONAL 
IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION 
Advances in technology have resulted in 
increased volumes of information being stored 
electronically, particularly on the Internet [5], 
which, include personal identification information 
[6]. Personal identification information is 
information that is unique to the person, for 
example their name, address and credit card number 
[7]. In the event of a data breach, it is this 
information that can present vulnerabilities for 
identity crime to the individual [8]. Identity crime 
can also impact on corporations also where personal 
details are used to defraud corporations [9]. While 
corporations may be responsible for this crime, they 
can also be the victim. Nonetheless, 33% of the 
information exposed through data breaches includes 
personal identification information like names, 
addresses and credit card numbers [10].  
In many countries there is no compulsion to 
record breaches of data. Further, in Australia, at 
present, there is no formal requirement regarding 
such breaches [1], however Australia will introduce 
data breach notification requirements in 2014 [11]. 
Prior to enactment of the new legislation, the 
approach to regulating privacy has been regulated 
by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), under which 
organisations and agencies storing personal 
information are subject to requirements to provide 
adequate security protection [12].  The Privacy Act 
applies to the use of information which is sensitive, 
including personal identification information [12]. 
There are criminal sanctions for the possession of 
personal identification information with the purpose 
of committing an offense in many States, for 
example Queensland [13]. However, when it comes 
to data breaches, the responsibility for the 
protection of private information is less clear in 
Australia, where an organisation or agency is not 
compelled to report data breaches, and the 
responsibility for this notification is therefore 
voluntary and falls back to the organisation 
concerned. This lack of mandatory reporting can 
have ramifications for identity theft. 
III. EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN DATA 
BREACHES AND IDENTITY CRIME 
The cost of data breaches has steadily increased 
[14]. At the same time, the number of identity 
crimes has increased, with for example the United 
States having over 15 million people that are victims 
of this crime each year [15]. A proportion of identity 
crime can be definitively traced back to data 
breaches,   hence, the causal relationship between 
data breach and identity crime has significance. 
Noteworthy is the statement by the United States 
Federal Trade Commission that the introduction of 
data disclosure laws has reduced identity theft by at 
about 6 percent [7]. This points toward a reduction, 
albeit a small one, in the incidence of identity crime 
as a direct result of regulatory implementation. 
Although early to predict, it is probable that the 
same trend will be evident with the introduction of a 
mandatory breach notification in Australia.   
IV. THE DRIVERS FOR MANDATORY BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 
In the existing regulatory environment in 
Australia, an organisation or agency involved in a 
data breach often exercises some discretion in 
dealing with that breach. As a consequence, many 
breaches may not be reported and appropriately 
actioned through notifying those involved or the 
Privacy Commissioner [6]. However, despite the 
largely voluntary nature of reporting, examples 
exist that demonstrate that some organisations and 
agencies, irrespective of the lack of compulsion to 
do so, actively take responsibility for data breaches 
and act accordingly by notifying those affected. 
[14]. However, because it is discretionary, this does 
not always occur. 
 
For localities that do not have mechanisms that 
compel data breach notifications such as Australia 
(at present), this results in difficulty in obtaining 
accurate data on the extent of data breaches. 
Symantec estimates that the cost of data breaches in 
Australia at $2.16 million in 2011 [14]. 
Nonetheless, examples of significant data breaches 
are still reported to the Privacy Commissioner, are 
from companies such as Sony [16] and Lego [17], 
with other notable breaches relating to Telstra [18] 
and Vodafone [19]. Likewise, significant instances 
of data breaches are also evident in other countries 
[20]. In this respect, for Australia, an advantage of 
having mandatory notification is that it may 
highlight a hidden societal problem [21].  
 
Data breach costs continue to increase, according 
to research undertaken by the Ponemon Institute 
and IBM, the costs of data breaches increased in 
Australia by $4 per record up to a total of $145 per 
record in 2014 [22]. Similarly, the average 
organisational cost per for data breaches increased 
in Australia from 2.72 million dollars in 2014 to 2.8 
million in 2014 [22]. A recent example of a data 
breach involving Australia involved eBay where a 
computer hacking attack resulted in data breaches to 
as many as 145 million customers [23]. The eBay 
breach was said to have occurred through the 
compromise of a small number of employee 
credentials [24]. These credentials were used to 
facilitate access to the personal identification 
information of customers. eBay admitted that the 
personal information had been taken but otherwise 
denied any risk of loss relating to financial 
information. The reason for this is that eBay 
account details are retained separate to financial 
details with PayPal. The particular personal 
information that was stolen included email 
addresses as well as physical addresses, phone 
numbers and dates of birth [24]. While this breach 
was not related to financial information, it involved 
personal identification information which has 
implications for identity crime.  
 
As a consequence of this breach, eBay took 
corrective action in notifying customers of the 
breach and also of the needed users to change log in 
details to prevent any further risk [25]. However, a 
criticism that arose following this breach was the 
delay taken by eBay to announce the breach and to 
make efforts to notify users. Further to this breach, 
there are investigations taking place on the liability 
of eBay for this breach particularly from U.S bodies 
located within Connecticut, Florida and Illinois 
[25]. There may result in further legal action and 
will be followed with interest. 
 
This eBay breach came only months after a 
significant data breach involving the retailer Target 
in the United States where 100 million users were 
purported to have been impacts [26]. In this breach 
up to 30 million financial details were stolen over a 
two month period with up to 70 million personal 
details stolen. The breach in Target was disclosed in 
December 2013 [26]. The personal details breached 
included names, addresses and phone number of 
Target customers [26]. As a consequence of this 
breach, Target identified a drop in profits of around 
46 per cent in profit on the year before, this loss is 
directly attributable to this data breach. Arising from 
this breach, financial institutions also sufferred 
losses expressed through the reissuance of cards and 
the upgrading of payment systems. These losses 
were estimated to amount to an estimated at 200 
million dollars [26]. For corporations there are 
potentially significant costs attached with data 
breaches that include losses to future revenue 
through lost consumer confidence [22]. In the loss to 
Target, in addition to a financial sanction imposed of 
17 million dollars ($US), this also impacts on the 
goodwill to the organisation which directly results in 
financial harm [27]. 
Research undertaken by Symantec in 2013 found 
that Australia is prominent as a country impacted by 
data breaches [28]. Furthermore, Australian 
companies had the largest number of records 
compromised particularly where contrasts might be 
made to data breaches in other countries like Italy 
and Japan which were comparatively minimal [28]. 
Associated with these loses are abnormally high rate 
of customer churn which means that consumer loss 
associated with this crime is significant, as  evident 
from the Target example expressed previously [28]. 
Interestingly the United States expended the most 
resources on notification and perhaps attributes a 
lower levels of customer loss and from this it will be 
interesting to observe if this changes in Australia 
through the introduction of mandatory breach 
notification laws in Australia change the extent of 
churn [28]. 
V. THE MARKET FOR INFORMATION 
 
Personal identification information has a value, 
which can be equated to assets that can be traded 
and sold [29]. While often the value of this 
information is based on benefit that’s comes from it 
[29]. Now the risk to individuals is far more 
profound with information being shared online as 
well as traded like a commodity [30]. There are 
likely to be many costs associated with the misuse of 
information arising from data breaches that are not 
readily estimated. It is difficult to know how and in 
what way information will be used in the future. For 
instance, with identity crime, personal identification 
information can be warehoused by an identity 
criminal and used some time later to perpetrate 
crime and this makes it difficult to know when the 
crime will be committed and from what source the 
details were obtained. This crime is pervasive as 
many victims will not find out they have becomes 
victims until they are contacted by debt collectors 
[30]. At that time, they will need to establish how 
this took place and from where to prevent it 
occurring again. This becomes difficult with such a 
time lapse between the data acquisition and the 
crime. 
 
Personal identification information has value and 
has created a market in the trade of it [31]. Many 
individuals born after 2012 will have a profound 
digital footprint on the Internet [32]. They may 
develop an identity on the Internet from birth that 
will extend their life. Personal information is far 
easier to aggregate because of the ways it is shared 
and social networking is partly responsible for this 
[32]. The capability for information dissemination 
is made more dramatic through the emergence of 
‘big data’. ‘Big data’ can be expressed as data made 
up of complex data sets which are mammoth. Some 
of this data incorporates personal identification 
information, financial information as well as 
various other types [32]. Another emerging and 
potential risk of identity crime is that of the risk of 
data breaches through clouds [33]. The vulnerability 
for data in clouds, like that from big data is based 
on the extent of information stored which is likely 
to contain a significant amount of information [33]. 
The potential for loss for personal identification 
information is substantial given the amount of 
organisations storing data online and the reliance on 
this emerging technology for this information 
storage [34]. 
 
Romansky, Telang and Acquisti suggest that while 
a person has a right to know of a data breach 
involving their personal information, another driver 
for compelling such notification is information 
dissemination more broadly to increase communal 
knowledge of the occurrence [7]. Such 
dissemination of information means that the 
practices undertaken by organisations and agencies 
relating to the management of information may 
become more transparent [35], meaning that 
individuals are better aware of where the greater 
and lesser risks arise.  
 
Anecdotally, in Australia there is mixed support 
for the introduction of mandatory breach 
notification. In 2012, a representative sample of 700 
Australians who were surveyed by eBay found that 
80% of respondents supported the introduction of 
laws requiring notification of breaches in Australia 
[36]. This statistic is likely to be different today 
following the eBay data breach in 2014. 
Interestingly, many of those surveyed were most 
concerned about identity theft and the loss of 
financial data resulting from data breaches, and it 
was these considerations that drove their support 
[36]. Therefore a driver for regulatory change is the 
very real threat of identity crime [36]. This 
sentiment is similarly reflected other jurisdictions 
[37].   
According to the Australian Privacy Breach 
Notification Discussion paper, earlier 
recommendations by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) in relation to mandatory 
breach notification were subject to criticism [1]. 
However, it was clear that some response to dealing 
with data breaches through the privacy regulatory 
responses available was still needed. The Office of 
the Australian Information Commissioner 
introduced a guide to handling security breaches as a 
measure to mitigate the impacts of data breaches [1], 
providing a guide to practical steps to handle data 
breaches, among other things [12]. However, a 
limitation of this is that it does not compel any 
notification in respect of a breach or prescribe 
penalties [1]. Nonetheless, the guide is helpful in 
assisting organisations and agencies with data 
breaches until more formalised rules and regulations 
take effect in Australia [1].  
An important driver for the introduction of laws 
around mandatory data breach notification is that 
this could serve as a deterrent to overcome poor 
information management practices [1]. This is 
based on the consequences that flow to the 
organisation or agency that does not deal with 
personal identification information in an appropriate 
manner [1]. According to the Australian Privacy 
Breach Notification Discussion paper, there is merit 
in the identification of bodies that do not take 
appropriate steps in responding to data breaches [1]. 
In addition, a side benefit, is that the broader 
community confidence in the approaches that are 
taken to manage information [1]. These are 
powerful motivators to having such laws introduced 
in Australia. 
 
Laws relating to mandatory notification of data 
breaches have been implemented in a number of 
countries including, the United States (mentioned 
above), Germany, Norway and Japan [37]. In the 
United States for instance, such approaches to 
dealing with data breaches go historically as far 
back as 2003 in California [38]. There are lessons to 
be learnt from those who have developed similar 
laws in the past, such as moderating the number of 
warnings to avoid fatigue [1]. Despite the obvious 
improvement to policy and practice that relates to 
the overall improvement to privacy that such a 
regulatory change makes, there are others that relate 
to the relationship between privacy and other 
crimes.  
VI.   THE LINK BETWEEN DATA BREACHES AND 
IDENTITY CRIME  
Romanosky, Telang and Acquisti suggest that 
the link between identity theft and data breaches is 
tenuous due to the lack of data available to 
conclusively support this relationship [7], and that 
further, the data around identity crime is 
questionable. Needles also suggests that the 
relationship is not significant due to the lack of data 
available to support such a link [39]. However, 
Cate, Abrams, Bruening and Swindle aver that the 
nexus between data breaches and identity theft is 
under stated because the true extent of identity 
crime is not known [40]. However, Romanosky, 
Telang and Acquisti state that up over 30% of 
identity thefts are caused by data breaches by 
corporations [7], and Burdon notes that an 
important link exists between data breach 
notification and the mitigation of identity theft [41]. 
Likewise, Regan highlights that mandatory breach 
notifications can positively reduce identity crime 
through increasing awareness [42]. Therefore 
despite the difficulties in drawing direct linkages 
between data breaches and identity crime, there is a 
relationship [43].   
 
The ALRC notes that in the United States, a key 
rationale for the introduction of mandatory breach 
notification laws was around mitigating the potential 
for identity theft [44]. Accordingly, the ALRC 
suggests that in Australia, without regulatory 
oversight of data breaches and the appropriate 
notifications stemming from these, the risks 
associated with identity theft will only increase [44]. 
This may be aside from whether there are consistent 
criminal sanctions relating to identity crimes. 
Therefore, the ALRC argues that through regulating 
the reporting of data breaches it may be possible to 
mitigate the damage arising from identity crime 
[44]. Consequently, there is more work that is 
needed to explore the relationship between these 
variables. 
VII. HOW MIGHT THE REGULATORY RESPONSE 
LOOK? 
In Australia, the approach proposed to mandate 
the reporting of data breaches is based on the 
privacy frameworks and related technologies [45]. 
Australian governmental agencies, as well as 
private sector organisations [46], are guided by 
principles outlining how information can be used, 
disclosed and stored [47]. This is different from the 
approach in the United States, which emphases 
specific uses of personal information such as health 
information, [48] and that of driver’s licenses [49]. 
However, there is often many forms of personal 
identification information that can become 
susceptible through data breaches. The principles in 
the United States are not founded on privacy 
principles in the same way as the Australian 
approach, and rather represent disparate approaches 
driven by state specific regulatory needs than an 
overarching approach, which means the approach in 
Australia is likely to be different to the United 
States.   
 
An issue with dealing with identity crime is that 
it is not regulated internationally and rather falls to 
various domestic regulatory mechanisms for effect 
[50]. The international agreement that deals with 
identity crime is in the European Convention on 
Cybercrime [51] which promotes cooperation and 
coordination in cyber-crimes. However, despite this 
convention there are arguably inadequate and 
inconsistent national responses to this crime [51]. 
This has implications for the prevention of the 
identity crime as well as the measures of redress 
[51]. Discrepancies in the regulatory responses to 
identity crime are evident through research 
undertaken through the European Union which 
found that most countries do not have specific laws 
that deal with identity theft [51]. To provide a 
contrast, in Latvia, has sanctions attached to identity 
crime which state that the crime has a penalty of up 
to 15 years imprisonment [52]. In Romania the 
penalties for this crime are up to 20 years 
imprisonment for offences [53]. In contrast, other 
European countries like Finland which has a penalty 
of up to 4 years [54] and Denmark 6 years 
imprisonment [55]. Hence, with European 
Countries there are significant differences in the 
penalties for this crime.  
VIII.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE US: WHAT 
SHOULD BE REPORTED?  
  The response to the question of what should be 
reported is dependent on the stringency of response 
applied to the reporting requirement. A broader 
policy question that needs consideration is what 
breaches should be reported? This has been referred 
to as the ‘trigger’ for the notification of a breach in 
parts of the United States [56]. Reporting data 
breaches has a cost associated with it, and the more 
stringent the reporting requirement then the more 
costly it becomes [1]. However, not adequately 
reporting a breach renders the reporting process 
unworkable, and any remedial responses arising 
from the breach unattainable. Therefore, there is a 
delicate balance in the reporting process in terms of 
identifying the incidence of data breach that should 
be reported and in this respect, the response needs 
to be substantive enough to make it worthwhile. In 
the United States, for instance, a negative 
consequence has been observed through the overuse 
of notification mechanisms which can result in 
complacency due to fatigue [1]. It is hoped that this 
is will not be the outcome of regulatory reform in 
Australia as the focus is rather on an assessment and 
notification where there is a breach that places a 
person at risk of harm [57]. 
 
The ALRC suggested models for data breach 
notification in Australia which were largely based 
on the United States approach [6]. Jurisdictions in 
the United States tend to have stringent triggers for 
reporting data breaches but tend to vary between 
States; For instance, Indiana requires a database 
owner who knows or should know that the data has 
been breached to report such incidence [58]. This 
places a responsibility on the organisation 
concerned to report instances where there might be 
a suspicion of data loss. This may be a reasonable 
approach for Australia however there are diverging 
views about what information should qualify for 
mandatory breach notification; and the organisation 
or agency involved may not be in the best position 
to make determinations as to what should be 
reported. Therefore deferring such responsibility to 
another authority such as the Privacy Commissioner 
may be preferable [1]. This is what is being 
proposed in Australia under the current bill [57]. 
Ideally the data that is likely to have an adverse 
effect on the individual is the data that should be 
reported and this can be construed broadly [1].   
 
Key to the effectiveness of any such notification 
of breach will be the speed in which such 
notification take place, so as to mitigate any possible 
consequences flowing from that breach [1]. Further 
the way in which this communication takes place 
will invariably impact on the speed of such a 
response [1]. In the United States, in California, the 
requirement is the most expedient manner to avoid 
unreasonable delay [56]. How this will be applied in 
an Australian context, is not yet clear, however it 
certainly appear to be as soon as practicable 
following the breach [57]. Regardless, any 
notification of breach must be timely to be effective 
particularly given the speed in which misuse of data 
can take place [46]. 
IX. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN AUSTRALIA 
A Federal approach to mandatory data breach 
notification could provide uniformity in respect of 
the approach taken and potentially avoid issues 
arising through a mixture of responses based on 
State laws or similar [42]. Similar to the United 
States this may overcome the issue of variability in 
State based approaches to mandatory breach 
notification and inconsistencies [58]. Another 
advantage of a Federally regulated approach is that 
it would provide consistent remedies for the victims 
of such data breaches [58]. This is the proposed 
approach to be adopted within Australia.   
The ALRC has suggested that market based 
incentives remain an important tool for improving 
information security measures [44]. The threat to 
reputation is a market driven force that is important 
in mitigating data breaches [59]. Arising from this 
threat, the damage to reputation for such bodies can 
be extensive [41]. The ALRC recognise reputational 
damage as an incentive for organisations to improve 
information security but ultimately they also take 
the view that this alone was not an adequate 
measure and needed to be accompanied by a 
regulatory response prompting action [6]. 
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the role 
that is played by these other factors in mitigating 
the effect of data breaches. 
There has been debate around the sanctions that 
should apply to organisations or agencies that fail to 
notify of a data breach [1]. Therefore, if the 
penalties are civil and monetary then what should 
these be in terms of a sanction amounts?  If these 
are non-monetary, then how should this be framed?  
The proposed changes would allow the Privacy 
Commissioner to investigate and make 
determinations as well as provide remedies for non-
compliance through the Privacy Act [57]. The 
United Kingdom, for instance, applies a fixed 
penalty of a thousand pounds to data breaches [60]. 
Alternative options to civil penalties include 
administrative penalties, in addition to naming 
organisations and agencies that do not report data 
breaches [1]. This has implications for reputation 
which have been identified above. Perhaps an 
appropriate penalty involves a mixture of these 
options. The governmental approach to these 
remains unclear in until the bill becomes law and 
the future actions, in this regard will becomes 
clearer in time.  
  
An important part of mitigating data loss is to 
encourage organisations and agencies to engage 
with better data management practices, including 
acknowledging the steps that have been taken by 
organisations and agencies to mitigate risk attached 
to potential breaches. This might include for 
instance, what emphasis is placed on encryption or 
similar steps to mitigate data breaches, which is 
recognised in other jurisdictions [61]. The ALRC 
considered this important for reducing liability in 
instances of data breaches [6]. The implementation 
of preventative measures needs to be recognised as 
a deterrent to data breaches, but the extent of this 
needs to consistently. 
In Australia, those against mandatory data breach 
reporting argue that such reporting can impose 
unreasonable financial burdens on organisations 
[62]. The cost stems from the cost in making 
contact with the person whose data has been 
breached [7]. This is reflected in Australia, at 
present by the voluntary reporting 
requirements/expectations under the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner [1]. 
However, at present, there is little incentive for 
organisations and agencies to comply with reporting 
of data breaches [63], and the ALRC similarly 
asserts that this poor market incentives result in low 
levels of reporting [64]. If the status quo in dealing 
with data breaches was working effectively it would 
be unlikely that such debate would be occurring 
regarding the need for mandatory notification of 
breach laws in Australia nor elsewhere.  
 
In Australia, the regulatory change is set to 
commence in 2014. The new regulatory 
requirements will oblige organisations to provide 
notifications where the data breach will result in 
harm that is ‘serious’ [65], including injury to 
feelings, reputation, financial or economic harm 
[66]. This requirement provides, among other 
things, for the entity concerned to as soon as 
practicable notify the Commissioner and each 
individual significantly affected by the data breach 
[67]. The regulatory change modifies the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) by establishing mandatory 
notification through the changes proposed in the 
Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2013 
[68]. This amendment provides the right for the 
Privacy Commissioner to take enforcement action, 
investigate complaints as well as obtain 
undertakings from organisations about compliance. 
Similarly civil penalties will also be available under 
this regime [68].  
  
The trend to recognise legislative requirements 
for the notification of data breaches has certainly 
been a factor in introduction of such rules into 
Australia [66]. In particular, in this context, strong 
reference is made to the United States that has 
adopted some regulatory approach to dealing with 
data breaches. Further, reference has also been 
made to the European Union which similarly 
requires telecommunication and internet service 
providers to disclose certain data breaches to 
national authorities [69]. Importantly, within this 
jurisdiction, a further draft data protection 
regulation document broadens these obligations 
[70]. 
 
A concern expressed by the ALRC was that they 
wish to reduce the burden of compliance [1], a 
sentiment that is similarly reflected in other 
jurisdictions and certainly identified as an area of 
concern in the European Union [1]. Thereby care 
has been taken to identify breaches as ‘serious data 
breaches’ for the purposes of the legislation as the 
trigger upon which action must be taken [68]. What 
is interesting about the developments in the 
regulatory responses to data breach disclosure is 
that increasingly there is an awareness of the need 
for an appropriate regulatory response, and the 
government is tentatively approaching this. It will 
be interesting to observe the developments in this 
regard. 
X. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND THE 
LESSON LEARNED 
 
In 2014 amendments took effect in Australia in 
relation to privacy through The Privacy Amendment 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 which 
introduced a range of changes to the privacy 
principles regulating the handling of personal 
information [71]. This applies to the ways in which 
personal information is dealt with by the Australian 
Governments agencies and some private sector 
organisations. The provisions enhanced the powers 
of the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner and changes to credit reporting laws, 
and provide greater recognition of external dispute 
resolution schemes and privacy codes [71]. The 
recent changes to the privacy laws represent the 
largest changes to these laws in 25 years in 
Australia [71]. Specific to this article are the 
changes that have been made to Australian Privacy 
Principles 6, 7 and 8 which all relate to the 
disclosure of personal information; the use or 
disclosure of personal information, the use of 
information for direct marketing and cross-border 
disclosure of personal information. However, the 
specific Bill to provide for mandatory breach 
notification unfortunately lapsed in Australian 
Parliament resulting in a delay in it becoming law. 
The significant aspect of this bill is that it would 
allow the investigation of data breaches but this is 
delayed until the bill becomes law [71].  
 
XI. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF A SUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION – REGULATORY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 
It can be difficult to assess the extent to which 
regulatory efforts will influence identity crime. 
More research is needed to gauge the impact of 
changes to privacy law on the incidence of 
identity crime. In studies by the European Union 
it was recognised that it is desirable to have a 
coordinated mechanism to report crime 
internationally [51]. The centralisation of data 
collection functions is important for the collection 
of data related to this crime as well as potentially 
providing support mechanisms for victims [51]. 
In addition, having a centralised data collection 
function, improves the common understanding of 
this crime [51]. The focus on victims is important 
as they wear the loss and are seldom the focus of 
regulation as the focus seems to remain on the 
offender rather than the victim. This might 
provide a useful way forward in dealing with this 
crime and perhaps also better understanding the 
relationship between data breaches and identity 
crime. 
XII. SIGNIFICANCE  
This paper brings together existing literature on 
the relationship between identity crime and 
mandatory breach notification laws. Given the 
increased prevalence of both data breaches and of 
identity crime it is important to acknowledge the 
existence of the relationship between these 
variables. Further, where laws are introduced to 
deal with mandatory breach disclosure, as they are 
at present in Australia, it is vital to consider the 
implications such laws will have on the reduction of 
identity crime. It is also important to recognise that 
while there is a link between data breaches and 
identity crime that is somewhat tenuous, there is a 
significant relationship. This will only be 
measureable post-implementation, and can form the 
basis of future discussion. 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
Both the literature and issues currently being 
experienced in practice suggests that there is a need 
to be able to mitigate data breaches, which will in 
turn assist in the prevention of identity crime. It is 
not clear whether regulating the notification of data 
breaches is going to have discernible impact on 
identity crime, and only time will reveal the true 
extent of this. However, what is clear from this 
conceptual research is that there is a relationship 
between data breaches and identity crime that 
means that a reduction in one (data breaches) are 
likely to result in a reduction in the other.  Hence, it 
is reasonable to suggest that the introduction of 
mandatory breach notification laws in Australia will 
have a direct impact on the incidence of identity 
crime in that country.  
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